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Abstract: e Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) which was founded in 1993 
is a dual-layered forum of cooperation between governments and regions in the 
Barents Region. It is based on the legally non-binding Kirkenes Declaration, 
whose overarching aim is to promote sustainable development in the region. To 
this end, the protection of the environment is to be included in all its activities. 
is article analyzes the inclusion of the concept of sustainable development in 
the cooperative structure of the BEAR based on the 1992 Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21. Several selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) are 
analyzed against the background of their reection in the BEAR working proce-
dures. In the case of some MEAs, dierent statuses of ratication in Russia and 
the Nordic Barents states aggravate their implementation in the BEAR context. 
Notwithstanding, the forum has developed dierent strategies which enable 
their successful application for the Barents Region.
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1. Introduction
!e collapse of the Soviet Union marked the new beginning of cooperation in the 
Arctic. Formerly an arena of the Cold War, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in 
1987 in Murmansk marked the turning point in Arctic politics and opened the 
door for cooperative dialogue.2 While the new cooperative environment yielded 
the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) 1991 which resulted in the 
establishment of the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996, also another Arctic area – the 
Barents Region – was a"ected by the new political ecology and several states3 
launched a cooperative initiative to mitigate the pressing issues at hand – the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) in 1993. Parallel to the end of the Cold War, 
international environmental law became subject to new standards, in particular 
since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro 1992 (henceforth referred to as the Rio Conference) and the conclusion of 
several groundbreaking international environmental agreements.4
Since the early 1990s, both international environmental law and cooperation 
under the BEAR have undergone signi$cant developments, and its Member States 
have managed to cooperate deeply and to improve the environmental conditions 
in the Barents Region under the umbrella of the BEAR.
Although there is no speci$c international treaty governing the Barents Region, 
the Barents states have committed to and shaped a framework of governance for 
the region, and in particular on the environmental level5 by becoming parties to 
international treaties and endorsing legally non-binding agreements. !erefore, by 
re%ecting international standards of environmental governance through its work-
ing structure, the BEAR can serve as an example for a sophisticated and e"ective 
2. Heininen, Lassi. 2004. Chapter 12 – “Circumpolar International Relations and Geopolitics.” In: 
Arctic Human Development Report, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Akureyri, pp. 207–225, p. 208.
3. Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden as those states located in the Barents Region, as well as Den-
mark, Iceland and the European Commission representing the EU.
4. Both legally binding and legally non-binding agreements that have increased the environmental 
standards in international law have been concluded in Rio. Two legally-binding conventions, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as the legally non-binding Agenda 21; the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development; and the Statement of Principles for the Sustainable 
Management of Forests constitute the outcome of the summit.
5. Ibid.
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mode of multilayered so#-law cooperation yet implementing both hard- and so#-
law Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA). Furthermore, the re%ection 
of MEAs in the Barents environmental cooperation becomes important in the 
context of its legitimacy, as “what is legitimate is what the law ordains,”6 yet taking 
into account also the social structure and normative community, creating a type 
of institutionalization that creates its “aura of legitimacy”7 through its degree of 
adhering to the provisions of international law manifested in rules, procedures 
and discourse as well as the BEAC Members’ rights to interpret, implement and 
apply these rules, discourses and procedures.8
!is article examines to what extent the Barents environmental cooperation 
manages to implement international environmental standards in its working 
structure also in light of di"erent statuses of rati$cation. !is article argues that 
although there is no regional environmental agreement for the Barents Region, the 
BEAR provides e&cient implementation of MEAs making environmental protec-
tion a key concern and outcome of the cooperation. Since the Barents cooperation 
is a so#-law forum for cooperation its e&ciency is based on the voluntary com-
mitment of its members. !erefore, it is crucial that the members follow common 
goals. But since the status of rati$cation di"ers from the Nordic states and Russia, 
this article reviews the BEAR’s strategies to e"ectively incorporate these MEAs 
into the Barents environmental cooperation in light Russian non-rati$cation of 
several protocols of the LRTAP Convention and her former non-rati$cation of the 
POPs Convention.9 Several selected MEAs10 are presented against the background 
6. Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 9.
7. Bernstein, Steven. 2004. !e Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: !ree Concep-
tions. McMaster University, Hamilton, p. 9.
8. Abbott, Kenneth W. et al. 2000. “!e Concept of Legalization.” In: International Organization, 
Vol. 54 (3), pp. 17–35, p. 17.
9. It must be noted that the $ndings presented in this article primarily deal with the intergovern-
mental level of the Barents cooperation. Furthermore, in case of the POPs Convention, which 
Russia rati$ed in November 2011, this article deals with the implementation strategies prior to 
Russian rati$cation, as at the time of writing it is too early to assess changes in implementation 
strategies in the post-rati$cation era.
10. For the purpose of this article six multilateral environmental agreements, i.e., the Ramsar Con-
vention on Wetlands of International Importance, 1971; !e World Heritage Convention, 1972; 
!e Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979; !e Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, 1992; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, 1992; and Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
2002 and their relevance for and application in the BEAR will be analyzed. !e status of rati$-
cation in the respective BEAC state is given in the relevant section.
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of their re%ection in di"erent types of documents of the Barents environmental 
cooperation.
2. The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)
!e Barents Euro-Arctic Region was incepted in 1993 at a meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers or other High-level representatives of Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
Finland, in addition to the European Commission, Iceland and Denmark in 
Kirkenes, Norway. Based on the initiative of Norway’s then-Foreign Minister Mr. 
!orvald Stoltenberg a cooperative structure for the Barents Region took shape11 in 
order to enhance security, stability and cooperation in the Barents Region, both on 
the intergovernmental and regional level.12 To this end, based on the Declaration 
following the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference of 
Foreign Ministers13 held 11 january 1993 in Kirkenes, Norway, the intergovern-
mental Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council 
(BRC) were created, constituting the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)14,15 which 
now encompasses a land area of 1 755 800 km2 with a population of about 6 mil-
lion people.16
11. Rafaelsen, Rune. 2010. “!e Barents Cooperation – New Regional Approach for Foreign Policy 
in the High North.” In: Staalesen, Atle (ed.). 2010. Talking Barents – People, Borders and Regional 
Cooperation, Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Kirkenes, pp. 25–31, pp. 25–26.
12. See Barents Euro-Arctic Council o&cial website, “Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Re-
gion,” http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3, acces-
sed February 20, 2012.
13. Henceforth referred to as the Kirkenes Declaration.http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/459_
doc_KirkenesDeclaration.pdf, accessed February 15, 2012.
14. Members of the BEAC are: Norway, Russia, Sweden, Finland, the European Commission, Ice-
land and Denmark with the Observer States Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, United Kingdom and the USA; !e 13 provinces constituting the BRC are: in Finland 
– Lapland province; in Norway – Troms, Finnmark and Nordland provinces; in Russia – Ar-
changelsk and Murmansk Oblasts; and in Sweden – Norrbotten and Västerbotten län. Already 
in April 1993 the Republic of Karelia and up until 2002 the Finnish counties of Oulu and Kainuu 
as well as the Russian Komi Republic and Nenets Autonomous Okrug joined the BRC. !e Fin-
nish province of North Karelia was granted observer status in 2008.
15. BEAR. 2011 (a). Barents Comprehensive Information Paper.http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/
docs/Barents_Cooperation_information_English_August_2011.pdf, accessed October 14, 2011, 
p. 1.
16. Supra note 11, p. 25.
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Source: Arctic Centre – University of Lapland17
Apart from the intergovernmental and regional level, the BEAR also includes the 
three Barents indigenous peoples, i.e., the Sámi, Veps and Nenets who in the Working 
Group on Indigenous Peoples have advisory status for both BEAC and BRC.18
!e Barents Euro-Arctic Region’s $elds of cooperation are diverse, taking inter 
alia: environmental, cultural, economic and climate change concerns into ac-
count.19 !e Barents cooperation’s overall goal is to achieve sustainable devel-
opment in the Barents Region, directly referring to the provisions of the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21. To this end, the Kirkenes Declaration highlights an-
ticipated cooperation in the areas of the environment; economy; science and tech-
nology; regional infrastructure; indigenous peoples; human contacts and cultural 
relations; and tourism.
17. Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. 2010. http://www.barentsinfo.$/barentsmap.htm, acces-
sed March 14, 2012.
18. BEAC, Working Group of Indigenous Peoples. http://www.beac.st/?DeptID=8852, accessed Fe-
bruary 20, 2012.
19. Hasanat, Waliul. 2010. “Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region in the Light of Interna-
tional Law.” In: Alfredsson, Gudmundur, Timo Koivurova and Natalia Loukacheva (eds.). Year-
book of Polar Law,Vol. II, Martinus Nijho" Publishers: Leiden & Boston pp. 279–309; pp. 287–
298; Sreejith, S.G. 2009. “Subjective Environmentalism: !e Barents Euro-Arctic Council and 
its Climate Change Policy.” In: Koivurova, Timo, E. Carina H. Keskitalo and Nigel Bankes (eds.). 
2009. Climate Governance in the Arctic, Springer, New York, pp. 383–402; pp.391–399.
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3. The Barents Cooperation, Sustainable Development 
and Arctic Governance
Cooperation under the auspices of the BEAR is based on the legally non-binding 
Kirkenes Declaration.20 Yet, with their signature, the cooperating states do indeed 
commit politically to several international agreements and standards,21 e.g., sus-
tainable development set forth e.g., in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.
Under its subheading “!e Barents Euro-Arctic Council and its Objectives” the 
Kirkenes Declaration reads that the “objective of the work of the Council will be 
to promote sustainable development in the Region, bearing in mind the principles 
and recommendations set out in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 of UNCED.” 
Both serve as the instrumental framework for the Barents cooperation as they 
foster environmental, human and cultural security. To this end, with their com-
mitment to these two legally non-binding instruments, the Barents cooperation’s 
goal, i.e. to promote sustainable development, responds to the needs of the popu-
lation in the Barents Region.22 Although the Kirkenes Declaration and any other 
o&cial document of the Barents’ cooperation abstains from a clear-cut de$nition 
of ‘sustainable development’ for its own purposes, it nevertheless frames the con-
cept as “bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the $elds of economy, trade, sci-
20. A development of a fairly recent origin is the conclusion of the legally binding “Agreement 
between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation within the Field 
of Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response,” concluded on December 11, 2008. Alt-
hough the Agreement has not yet come into force, it nevertheless shows the capability of the 
Barents cooperation to expand its framework into legally binding agreements.
21. See supranote 19 Hasanat: 300.
22. While there is no global de$nition of ‘sustainable development,’ the de$nition set forth in the 
1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report “Our Common 
Future” (henceforth referred to as the Brundtland Report) is widely spread. According to the 
Report, “(s)ustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present wit-
hout compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED (World 
Commission on Environment and Development). 1987. Our Common Future, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford; p. 43). While the notion of ‘needs’ in the Brundtland Report primarily 
aims at developing nations and encompasses “food, clothing, shelter, jobs” (Ibid.), the Barents 
cooperation has taken this concept further and takes economic development, customs issues, 
youth, transport, search and rescue, health, education, energy, culture and tourism into account 
(Barents Working Groups and Activities, http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arc-
tic_Council/Working_Groups.iw3, accessed February 13, 2012); While the notion of ‘needs’ in 
the Brundtland Report primarily aims at developing nations and encompasses “food, clothing, 
shelter, jobs” (Ibid.), the Barents cooperation has taken this concept further and takes economic 
development, customs issues, youth, transport, search and rescue, health, education, energy, 
culture and tourism into account (Barents Working Groups and Activities, http://www.beac.st/
in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Working_Groups.iw3, accessed February 13, 2012.
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ence and technology, tourism, the environment, infrastructure, educational and 
cultural exchange, as well as projects particularly aimed at improving the situation 
of indigenous peoples in the North,”23 re%ecting the needs of the local population, 
in line with the overall objectives of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.
!e Barents cooperation shows several traits for implementing sustainable de-
velopment in reference to both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21: $rstly, the 
inclusion of the environment into all its activities corresponds to the overall pur-
pose of Agenda 2124 and Principle 425 of the Rio Declaration. Secondly, in line with 
the recognition of dynamic and changing needs,26 the Barents cooperation is not 
static in its activities, but constantly adapts goals and working group composition 
to respond to these dynamics.27 !e Barents cooperation therefore constantly re-
assesses the needs for the region and its population, ensuring that ‘development’28 
is achieved in a way that is not limited to a $xed frame. !irdly, the inclusion of lo-
cal and indigenous people in the working procedure of the cooperation goes closely 
23. Kirkenes Declaration, Subheading “!e Barents Euro-Arctic Council and its objectives.”
24. !e Preamble of Agenda 21 states in point 1.1: “However, integration of environment and develop-
ment concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the ful$llment of basic needs, improved 
living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous fu-
ture,” http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_01.shtml, accessed February 13, 2012.
25. Rio Declaration, Principle 4: In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental pro-
tection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in 
isolation from it, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&
articleid=1163, accessed February 13, 2012.
26. Agenda 21 Preamble, 1.6: !e programme areas that constitute Agenda 21 are described in 
terms of the basis for action, objectives, activities and means of implementation. Agenda 21 
is a dynamic programme. It will be carried out by the various actors according to the di"erent 
situations, capacities and priorities of countries and regions in full respect of all the princi-
ples contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. It could evolve over 
time in the light of changing needs and circumstances. !is process marks the beginning of 
a new global partnership for sustainable development, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/
res_agenda21_01.shtml, accessed February 13, 2012.
27. !e Committee of Senior O&cials (CSO) holds the mandate to create new working groups and 
to disband those that have completed their appointed tasks, http://www.beac.st/in_English/Ba-
rents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Committee_of_Senior_O&cials.
iw3, accessed February 13, 2012.
28. !e Brundtland Report frames the term development in the following: “Development involves a 
progressive transformation of economy and society. A development path that is sustainable in a 
physical sense could theoretically be pursued in a rigid social and political setting. But physical 
sustainability cannot be secured unless development policies pay attention to such considera-
tions as changes in access to resources and in the distribution of costs and bene$ts. Even the nar-
row notion of physical sustainability implies the concern for social equity between generations, 
a concern that must logically be extended to equity within each generation,” supra note 22, 43.
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in line with Section III of Agenda 2129 and Principle 2230 of the Rio Declaration. 
!e operational dual-layered structure of the BEAR and the role of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Peoples show that the recommendations and aspiration of 
both Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration are adhered to from the outset.31
!e legally non-binding mode of governance is a trait of a circum-Arctic scope. 
!e AEPS, launched under the initiative of Finland in 1991 in order to streamline 
environmental protection strategies for the Arctic, marks the beginning of post-
Cold War Arctic cooperation.32 Four working groups – the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Protection of Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and the Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working Group – were established 
under the AEPS, contributing to the introduction of an Arctic dimension also into 
Northern European politics.33
Since the 1970s Canada envisaged a forum on the Arctic which was to go be-
yond a single-handed initiative with a merely environmental character such as the 
AEPS and which was to serve as a region-building mechanism, including Arctic 
29. Section III: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/
res_agenda21_00.shtml, accessed February 13, 2012.
30. Rio Declaration, Principle 22: Indigenous people and their communities and other local com-
munities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, 
culture and interests and enable their e"ective participation in the achievement of sustainable 
development, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&art
icleid=1163, accessed February 13, 2012.
31. !e rather weak wording in the Terms of Reference of the BEAC or the Joint Communiqués 
emphasizes the legally non-binding status of the cooperation and the lack of commitments for 
the BEAC member states. Only in the Agreement on the Establishment of an International 
Barents Secretariat (IBS Agreement) and other agreements following the IBS Agreement legal 
obligations are created (Hasanat, supra note 19 at pp. 300 and 301). Notwithstanding the Ba-
rents cooperation has managed to evolve in its scope and e"ectiveness in close adherence to 
international agreements, thus making it a crucial element in ensuring sustainable development 
for the Barents Region.
32. Tennberg, Monika. 2000.Arctic Environmental Cooperation – A Study in Governmentality, Ash-
gate, Burlington; p. 17.
33. For example, in 1992, the Council on Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was established between Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland Germany, Poland and Russia in 
order to enhance democratization and economic development for the formerly Soviet states, 
while its mandate also includes environmental protection, labour issues, the $ght against orga-
nized crime, nuclear safety and transport. Hønneland, Geir and Olav Schram Stokke, “Intro-
duction.” In: Stokke, Olav Schram and Geir Hønneland (eds.). 2007. International Cooperation 
and Arctic Governance – Regime E"ectiveness and northern Region Building, Routledge, London 
& New York pp. 1–12; pp. 3 and 4.
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States, Arctic indigenous peoples, territorial governments, regional representatives 
and non-Arctic actors. Based on Canada’s initiative the Ottawa Declaration was 
concluded in 1996, formally establishing the Arctic Council, including the eight 
Arctic States,34 three indigenous organizations35 as Permanent Participants, as well 
as Observers.36 !e AC furthermore became the coordinating body for the AEPS, 
which in 1998 was fully integrated into it making it fully operational37 and which was 
expanded by two more Working Groups, i.e., the Sustainable Development Working 
Group (SDWG) in 199838 and the Arctic Contaminant Action Program (ACAP) in 
2006.39 !e Barents Euro-Arctic Region closely cooperates with the AC’s Working 
Groups, which is especially relevant for the environmental dimension of Barents co-
operation40 and in particular for environmental clean-up41 and nature protection.42
34. Canada, the United States, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Russia and Denmark/Greenland.
35. !e Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council), the Sámi Council, and the Association of 
Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation (now 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North); Now, also the Aleutian Council, !e 
Arctic Athabascan Council and the Gwich’in Council are Permanent Participants of the AC the 
Gwich’in Council International.
36. Observership is granted to states and organizations. At the time of writing France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom are state observers; additionally, nine 
intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations as well as eleven non-governmental 
organizations, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/partners-links, accessed 
February 14, 2012.
37. Supra note 31, p. 3; Keskitalo, Carina. 2004. Negotiating the Arctic – !e Construction of an 
International Region, Routledge, London & New York, p. 75.
38. http://portal.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=12, accessed February 14, 2012.
39. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/acap, accessed February 14, 2012.
40. See, for example, Ministry of the Environment of Finland. 2005. Environmental Cooperation in 
the Barents Region – 10-Year Review, Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Helsinki; pp. 79–80.
41. !e list of the 42 environmental “Hot Spots” in the Barents Region which serves as the guiding 
tool for the improvement of the environmental conditions in the Barents Region is based on 
the collaborative work of the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) and AMAP; 
AMAP (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme). 2003. Updating of Environmental 
“Hot Spots” List in the Russian Part of the Barents Region – Proposal for Environmentally 
Sound Investment Projects. Oslo: AMAP, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE+AMAP-
NEFCO-Environmental+Hotspotlist.pdf, accessed February 14, 2012, p. 7.
42. In the 2010 Tromsø Declaration the Barents Environment Ministers stress the importance of 
cooperation with CAFF in the context of the creation of a Barents Protected Areas Network. !e 
AC’s recommendations are of speci$c importance e.g. for the Working Group on Environment 
Subgroup on Nature Protection (BEAC WGE 2010: 4). But also other WGE subgroups can be-
ne$t from the experiences of CAFF and its numerous projects that have been carried out since 
its inception in the $elds of protected areas, water management, or biodiversity assessments, 
http://www.ca".is/assessments, accessed February 14, 2012.
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4. Working Procedures of the BEAR
!e overall direction of the cooperation is decided on the Foreign Minister level, 
the di"erent sub-branches of the cooperation such as environmental cooperation 
are dealt with in the respective ministries. !e Ministers convene every other 
year.43 Between the meetings of the Ministers, the Committee of Senior O&cials 
(CSO), a body consisting of civil servants representing the BEAC Member States 
and the European Commission, convenes 4–5 times per year in order to coordinate 
and organize the work of the BEAC. On the regional level, the 13 Member Regions 
convene every other year. !e bi-annual meetings are accompanied by meetings 
of the Regional Committee, which holds responsibility for budget proposals; co-
ordinates and organizes the work of the BRC; steers the direction of the activity 
plan; and which is to implement the decisions taken by the BRC.44
A crucial role in the construct of the BEAR play the numerous working groups, 
committees and task forces. !e cooperative structure distinguishes between 
working groups under the intergovernmental level, the regional level, joint work-
ing groups and the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples. Due to the diversity 
of cooperation in the BEAR, its working groups inter alia comprise the Working 
Group of Economic Cooperation; Working Group on Youth Policy; Working 
Group on Environment; Regional Working Group on Communication; Regional 
Working Group on Investments and Economic Cooperation; Joint Committee on 
Rescue Cooperation in the Barents Region; or Joint Working Group on Culture.
!e functioning of the BEAR is furthermore supported by the International 
Barents Secretariat (IBS) which was established in 2008 in Kirkenes and which 
provides the chair states of the BEAR with organizational and administrative 
support. Apart from the IBS, also national Barents Secretariats exist in Norway 
and Finland, while during the Russian chairmanship 2007–2009 a temporary as-
sistant secretariat was established. Since the Swedish Chairmanship 2009–2011 
the Swedish Barents Secretariat is located within the Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia division of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
43. In the case of the Barents environmental cooperation, the Environment Ministers frame their 
scope and focuses of the cooperation in the bi-annual Ministerial Declarations which mirror 
ongoing developments in international (environmental) law and their relevance for the envi-
ronmental dimension of the BEAR. Since the BEAR was created as a so# law forum, the minis-
terial declarations do not state legal obligations and the BEAR member states are not required 
to implement the recommendations set forth in them under international law.
44. Supra note 19, Hasanat p. 286 and Sreejith p. 389.
              ﬂ             ﬀ
nikolas sellheim
228
5. The Environmental Dimension of the BEAR
Since the inception of the BEAR, the environment has been a crucial element 
for cooperation. In the Kirkenes Declaration, the fragility of and threats towards 
the Barents environment are identi$ed as key concerns for the region and for 
its  people, and therefore initiatives from all players involved are required.45 !e 
Kirkenes Declaration therefore includes the international framework in which the 
environmental dimension is to operate, i.e., it recalls the 1993 Joint Declaration 
from the meeting of the Ministers of Environment of the Nordic Countries and 
the Russian Federation and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention),46 while at the same 
time stressing the importance of cooperating with other Arctic monitoring initia-
tives and bodies such as the AEPS47 and the AMAP.
!e Kirkenes Declaration therefore calls for “expanded monitoring of eco-
logy and radioactivity in the Region; enhanced work on the operational safety of 
 nuclear facilities; Rehabilitation of areas that have been polluted as a result of the 
operation of nuclear Facilities.”48 It does not treat the environment as a separate 
$eld of cooperation in the Barents Region, but calls for an integration of the envi-
ronmental dimension into all other spheres of cooperation also by making direct 
reference to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 as standard setting instruments 
for cooperation in the Barents Region.
!e Barents environmental cooperation was o&cially brought to life in 1994 
with the adoption of the Barents Environment Action Programme (BEAP)49 at 
the $rst Barents Environment Ministers meeting.50 !e Programme was to deal 
inter alia with the prevention of radioactive and oil pollution; emission reduction; 
environmental impact assessments; or biodiversity preservation; and with the pro-
motion of implementation of international environmental agreements and conven-
tions in the Region.51 Four conventions are highlighted in the Programme, but as 
will be shown, the application of environmental conventions in the Barents envi-
ronmental cooperation goes beyond those four listed: the Convention on Biological 
45. Kirkenes Declaration, subheading “!e Environment.”
46. See the Convention and its four Annexes at:http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu 
=01481200000000_000000_000000, accessed February 15, 2012.
47. See the AEPS at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/ 
4-founding-documents, accessed February 15, 2012.
48. Kirkenes Declaration, subheading “!e Environment.”
49. http://www.unep.org/dewa/giwa/areas/barenv94.htm, accessed February 12, 2012.
50. See also Ministry of the Environment of Finland 2004: 9.
51. Barents Environment Action Programme, subheading “!e Objectives of the Barents Environ-
ment Action Programme.”
              ﬃ             ﬀ
the reflection of multilateral environmental agreements
229
Diversity (CBD);52 the Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife 
and Natural Habitats;53 the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species;54 and the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands55 played an integral part of the environmental 
dimension of the Barents cooperation.56
!e Kirkenes Declaration also recalls the provisions of the OSPAR Convention 
1992 which takes pollution from land-based sources into account. Several other MEAs 
$nd application in the working procedures of the cooperation or have been ‘added’ to 
the working procedure over time, exempli$ed by those MEAs analyzed in this article.
!e intergovernmental Working Group on Environment (WGE) was formally 
established in 1999 while due to the diversity of the issues, a more focused ap-
proach was chosen and several subgroups – Subgroup on Cleaner Production 
and sustainable consumption; Subgroup on Nature Protection (NPS); Subgroup 
on Water issues and Transboundary Cooperation; and Subgroup on “Hot Spots” 
Exclusion – were established corresponding to the environmental needs in the 
region and “in order to develop concrete projects.”57
6. MEAs in the Barents Environmental Cooperation
Due to the complexity of the BEAR working structure, the analysis provided in this 
article primarily takes the intergovernmental Working Group on Environment 
and its subgroups into consideration. Apart from those MEAs mentioned in the 
Kirkenes Declaration and the BEAP also others are set into the BEAR context. 
Due to the Russian non-rati$cation of the Berne and Bonn Conventions, these 
two MEAs are not considered.
!e MEAs presented here are ordered chronologically based on the year of 
their conclusion.58
52. http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf, accessed February 7, 2012.
53. http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/104.htm, accessed February 7, 2012.
54. http://www.cms.int/documents/convtxt/cms_convtxt.htm, accessed February 7, 2012.
55. http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-texts-convention-on/main/ramsar/1-31-
38%5E20671_4000_0__, accessed February 7, 2012.
56. !e Barents Environment Action Programme also highlights the importance of the AC’s CAFF 
Working Group.
57. BEAC WGE. 2008. Working Group on Environment (BEAC WGE) – Annual Report 2008, 
http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/Annual_report_WGE_2008_English.pdf, accessed Decem-
ber 20, 2011, p. 1.
58. !e United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has intentionally 
been le# out of this discussion, because it is the author’s opinion that climate change policy goes 
beyond the mere scope of environmental governance. For climate change-related activities in 
the BEAR, see Sreejith 2009 supra note 19.
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6.1. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance, 1971
!e Ramsar Convention constitutes an early multilateral environmental agree-
ment and has been in force since 1975. All members of the Barents coopera-
tion have rati$ed the Convention and it has been an underlying element of the 
Barents environmental cooperation, as under subheading “Protection of Habitats 
and Conservation of Flora and Fauna” the BEAP highlights the relevance of the 
Ramsar Convention for the Barents Region. Although the vague wording of the 
Ramsar provisions makes them prone to uncertainty of interpretation,59 its appli-
cation can be found in the WGE Subgroup on Water Issues and Transboundary 
Cooperation.60 While the Subgroup does not deal with the protection of waterfowl 
habitats,61 it exclusively deals with the protection of waterways in a transboundary 
context. !e mandate of the Swedish Chairmanship of the Subgroup 2010–2011 
emphasized the anthropogenic application of the Ramsar provisions, since the im-
provement of the quality of drinking water and the utilization of water resources 
are not referred to in an overall ecological context, but rather for improving the 
living conditions in the Barents Region.
!e BEAP refers to the protection of biodiversity in the Barents Region as a key 
concern. To this end, the Ramsar Convention plays an integral part. Also in the 
NPS, which “co-ordinates co-operation on biodiversity and habitat protection,”62 
the Ramsar Convention is an important tool for biodiversity protection on a na-
59. Birnie, Patricia, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell. 2009. International Law and the Environ-
ment. 3rd Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 673.
60. While the mission of the Ramsar Convention is the “the conservation and wise use of all wet-
lands through local and national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution to-
wards achieving sustainable development throughout the world” (Ramsar Convention O&cial 
Website, “!e Ramsar Mission,” http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-about-mission/main/
ramsar/1-36-53_4000_0__, accessed February 20, 2012), the Subgroup on Water Issues is gi-
ven the mandate to “to work on sustainable management of water resources and water use, on 
transboundary water bodies, on improvement of drinking water quality, on study of correlation 
of the climate change and condition of water bodies and wet-lands […]” BEAC 2010. Work 
Programme – Subgroup on Water Issues. Swedish Chairmanship 2010–2011,http://www.ba-
rentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE_Petrozavodsk_9_10_Nov_2010_Work_Programme_Subgroup_
on_Water_Issues_Final.pdf, accessed February 4, 2012, p. 4.
61. Waterfowl Habitats in the European Union are protected under the Habitats, Water and Birds 
Directives.
62. BEAC WGE. 2010 (a). Work-Programme – Subgroup for Nature Protection, http://www.ba-
rentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE_Petrozavodsk_9_10_Nov_2010_Work_Programme_Subgroup_
on_Nature_Protection_Final.pdf, accessed December 20, 2011, p. 3.
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tional and international level, complementing the CBD63 – not least manifested in 
the Memorandum of Cooperation between the CBD and the Ramsar Secretariats.64
!e Ramsar Convention is integral to the nature and biodiversity protection 
elements of the Barents environmental cooperation. While Sweden and Finland 
are bound to implement the Convention under the EU Directives and thus have 
harmonized provisions for implementation, the highlighting of the Ramsar 
Convention under the BEAC Working Groups and Subgroups thus constitutes 
a streamlined approach for implementing the Convention in the Barents Region.
6.2. The World Heritage Convention, 1972
Another convention of relevance to the Barents Region, yet which goes un-referred 
to in both the Kirkenes Declaration and the BEAP, is the 1972 UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention. Except for Iceland as a BEAR founding state, all Barents 
littoral states are party to the convention. Art. 4 of this Convention sets out that 
each member state recognizes that “the identi$cation, protection, conservation, 
presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural 
heritage” is in the duty of the respective member state. !e article furthermore 
reads that the state will do so “to the utmost of its own resources and, where ap-
propriate, with any international assistance and co-operation […].” When tak-
ing the Barents Region into consideration, under the World Heritage Convention 
further development of protected natural, cultural or mixed sites is encouraged. 
Although the Convention or protected areas are not referred to in the Kirkenes 
Declaration directly, under subheading “Indigenous Peoples” it nevertheless points 
to the “restoration and preservation of Nenets and Sámi cultural monuments” as 
an indirect indicator towards the World Heritage Convention.
!e issue of protected areas has gained momentum under the Swedish 
Chairmanship 2010–2011. In the Work Programme of the NPS, the necessity to 
designate protected areas also under the World Heritage Convention is empha-
sized.65 !e Work Programme gives an overview on anticipated and completed 
projects of the Subgroup which allows for the conclusion that the application of 
especially natural criteria has gained importance for the Barents cooperation. 
!e designation and further establishment of a Barents Protected Area Network 
63. !e Subgroup has the mandate “to work with projects on biodiversity conservation, ecosystem 
approach, protected areas, con-servation of natural and cultural heritage […] ” (BEAC WGE 
2010 (a): 4). To this end, the Ramsar Convention is included into the international framework 
of operation of the Subgroup (Ibid., 5).
64. See supra note 59, p. 672
65. See supra note 62, p. 5.
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(BPAN)66 as well as partnerships between already existing World Heritage sites 
shows that the cooperative approach under the World Heritage Convention is 
becoming increasingly relevant for the Barents environmental cooperation. !e 
designation of the Pyoza River as a protected area because of its signi$cant natural 
value can be considered a manifest of this relevance.67
6.3. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, 1979
!e LRTAP Convention has been rati$ed by all Barents founding states before 
the BEAR was incepted. !e actions taken by the Barents environmental coop-
eration can well be located within the “policies and strategies which shall serve as 
a means of combating the discharge of air pollutants” (LRTAP Art. 3). Although 
the Kirkenes Declaration makes no reference to the dangers of long-range and 
transboundary air pollution, it nevertheless takes air pollution and transbound-
ary environmental problems into account. !e BEAR Member States rati$ed the 
LRTAP Convention already in the inchoate phase of the BEAR, but initiatives 
directly related to LRTAP have started in 2002 with the launch of the Task Force 
on Cleaner Production which in 2003 was turned into the Subgroup for Cleaner 
production and Environmentally Sound Production (CPESC) whose mandate 
highlights inter alia the need for “projects on prevention and reduction of the 
pollution of environment by dangerous and harmful substance.”68 !e develop-
ment of projects related to LRTAP under the CPESC may be related to the com-
ing into force of $ve protocols to the convention between 1991 and 1999, of which 
Russia has merely signed one.69 It seems unlikely that Russia changes its stance on 
the LRTAP protocols judging from the o&cial documentation accompanying the 
CPESC. Personal communication with the then (Temporary) Subgroup on “Hot 
Spot” Exclusion, whose contact point overlaps with that of the CPESC, has shown 
66. Although there is no Memorandum of Understanding between BEAR and CAFF, in the context 
of protected areas cooperation with CAFF is close. (Personal communication, Working Group 
on Environment, February 23, 2012).
67. See supra note 62, p. 8.
68. BEAR. 2011 (b). Report 2010–2011 of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) Working Group 
on Environment (WGE) and the Regional Working Group on Environment (RWGE) to the 
10th meeting of the Ministers of the Environment Umeå, November 9, 2011, http://ruscp.ru/
attachments/article/115/Report%202010-2011%20of%20the%20BEAC%20WGE%20and%20
the%20Regional%20Working%20Group.pdf, accessed February 7, 2012, 6.
69. http://www.unece.org/$leadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/status/Status%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf, 
accessed March 14, 2012.
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that the normative e"ect of LRTAP plays a crucial role in in%uencing the work of 
the Barents environmental cooperation.70
6.4. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context, 1991
Of the BEAR Members, the EIA or Espoo Convention has been rati$ed by Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the EU, whereas Russia and Iceland have merely 
signed the Convention. Although the regional Nordic Barents States are parties to 
the Espoo Convention, Timo Koivurova71 points out that the fragile environment 
and the sparse population in the region aggravate the implementation of e.g., the 
participation rules as set out under the Convention.
Notwithstanding, in the Kirkenes Declaration direct reference to the  Espoo 
Convention is made in the context of economic cooperation, highlighting the 
“particular importance of observing the provisions of the [Espoo] Convention.”72 
Despite the weak formulation in the Kirkenes Declaration, EIAs have played a role 
in the WGE at least since the development of the BEAP when common practices 
for environmental management in the Barents Region were initiated. Both the 
Ministerial Meetings and the meetings of the WGE show a trend towards e"ective 
implementation of EIA procedures. While reference in earlier meeting documents, 
both from the Ministerial and working group meetings, is made to EIA proce-
dures and the Arctic Council Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment 
in the Arctic, the early 2000s show concrete steps in implementing sustainable 
EIAs in the Barents Region. Especially under the Finnish Chairmanship of the 
WGE 2003–2005, EIAs have become an important element of the activities to be 
carried out under the WGE.73
It must be noted that EIA emerges as an agenda item or an item of special 
reference in the Barents documentation in an unstable manner. It cannot be 
 assessed which processes lead to EIA procedures being of relevance in the WGE 
or Ministerial Meetings and which lead to the contrary. It can nevertheless be 
assumed that preferences by the chair countries or the meeting chairs shape the 
70. Personal Communication, (Temporary) Subgroup on “Hot Spot” Exclusion, January 10, 2011.
71. Koivurova, Timo. 2001. “Environment Impact Assessment in the Arctic – Study of the Inter-
national Legal Norms applicable to the Planning State of Environmentally Harmful Activities.” 
Rovaniemi: Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis, No. 42, pp. 134–138.
72. Kirkenes Declaration, subheading “Economic Cooperation.”
73. BEAC WGE. 2004 (a). Action Programme for the Finnish Chairmanship 2003–2005, http://
www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE_actionprogramme_$nal.pdf, accessed December 21, 
2011, 4–5.
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importance of EIAs in the meetings. Moreover, it can be assumed that the norma-
tive importance of the Espoo Convention in international law and international 
relations has found its way into the Barents environmental cooperation. !is hypo-
thesis is backed by the fact that although for instance the AC’s 1997 EIA Guidelines 
are legally non-binding,74 in the context of the Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline even Russia, 
as a non-party to the Espoo Convention, implements an EIA procedure.75
6.5. The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
!e CBD constitutes the backbone of global, domestic and regional biodiversity 
protection strategies and has been rati$ed by all BEAR members. Concluded at 
the Rio Conference 1992, it manifests a watershed in international environmen-
tal law and while aiming at the protection of biodiversity also takes “the sustain-
able use of biological resources, access to genetic resources, the sharing of bene-
$ts derived from the use of genetic material, and access to technology, including 
biotechnology”76 into account.
!e CBD has become a fundamental element of the Barents environmental 
cooperation and thus does not need explicit mentioning in the environmental 
context of the Barents cooperation as its provisions are applied in project develop-
ment and the political direction of the cooperation. Yet, it could be assumed that 
the Kirkenes Declaration makes reference to the CBD, which, however, is not the 
case. !is is due to the fact that the Kirkenes Declaration was cra#ed in January 
1993, whereas the CBD came into force only in December 1993. But by referring to 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, which both make the protection of biological 
diversity a core issue, the Kirkenes Declaration makes the protection of biological 
diversity a key concern for the Barents cooperation.
With the adoption of the BEAP, the protection of biodiversity has formally 
found its way into the Barents environmental cooperation. Since then, extensive 
bi- and multilateral cooperation for nature and biodiversity protection both on 
an intergovernmental and regional level has emerged in the Barents Region. For 
example, under the BEAR, the Habitat Contact Forum (HCF) was brought to life 
in 1999. !e HCF unites several stakeholders of the Barents Region under one 
74. Koivurova, Timo. 2008. “Transboundary Environmental Assessment in the Arctic.” In: Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2008, pp. 265–275, pp. 265–266.
75. Koivurova, Timo and Ismo Pölönen. 2009. “Transboundary Impact Assessment in the Case of 
the Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline.“ In: German Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 52. Duncker & Hum-
blot, Berlin pp. 293–325, pp. 304–309.
76. See supra note 59, p. 612.
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umbrella in order to establish nature reserves and management strategies.77 !e 
work on creating a Barents Protected Areas Network can be considered the latest 
step in e&ciently implementing strategies for nature and biodiversity protection 
also in unison with e.g. CAFF78 or the Natura 2000 network79 established under 
the Habitats Directive of the European Union.80
On a functional level, the CBD has become integral to the working procedures 
of the environmental dimension of the Barents cooperation. On multiple instances 
biodiversity plays a role in the cooperation, both in the WGE as well as other work-
ing groups. !e annual reports of the working groups provide a good overview on 
the role of protection of biodiversity in the Barents cooperation.
6.6. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, 1992
!e Watercourse Convention was signed in 1992 by most BEAR Member states 
while rati$cation occurred between 1993 and 1996. Iceland, however, has not 
signed the convention. Being a UNECE Convention, Birnie et al. state that it 
“is now the principle multilateral treaty governing environmental protection of 
European watercourses.”81 !e convention makes cross-reference to several ele-
ments of international environmental law, i.e., the polluter pays principle, the pre-
cautionary and ecosystem approach, EIA procedures and cooperation in research, 
governance and common standards for transboundary waterway protection.
Both the Kirkenes Declaration and the Barents Environment Action Programme 
do not make the protection of watercourses in the Barents Region a primary issue. 
In fact, transboundary watercourses are not mentioned in neither of the docu-
ments. Notwithstanding, transboundary watercourses can be located in the overall 
protection of the Barents environment. !e Kirkenes Declaration reads under the 
section “!e Environment” “that solving the existing major transboundary envi-
77. Ministry of the Environment of Finland 2005: 41.
78. Ibid.
79. BEAC WGE. 2011. Agenda Item “Barents Protected Area Network” at the 10th meeting of the Mi-
nisters of the Environment in the BEAC, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/10th_ Environment_
Ministers_Meeting_Umea_8_9_Nov_2011_Background_doc_BPAN.pdf, accessed February 7, 
2012, p. 1.
80. Article 3.1 of the Habitats Directive reads: “1. A coherent European ecological network of spe-
cial areas of conservation shall be set up under the title Natura 2000. !is network, composed 
of sites hosting the natural habitat types listed in Annex I and habitats of the species listed in 
Annex II, shall enable the natural habitat types and the species’ habitats concerned to be main-
tained or, where appropriate, restored at a favourable conservation status in their natural range.”
81. Supra note 59, p. 538.
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ronmental problems will be important in realising the potential for broader coop-
eration in the Region.” Similarly, in the context of biodiversity protection and the 
protection of the Barents environment in general, the Barents Environment Action 
Programme states that “[t]he Barents Council regards it as important to involve 
the local and regional authorities in the execution of the Action Programme, in 
particular in the $elds of: […] fresh water quality, including drinking water […].”
Also in the later years of the Barents cooperation water issues have not been on 
the forefront of its activities. But the signi$cance of tackling water-related problems 
in the Barents Region has become prominent at least since the creation of the WGE 
Subgroup on Water Issues in 2007; although the problems were known earlier.82 
According to its mandate the subgroup’s task is to “work on sustainable manage-
ment of water resources and water use, on transboundary water bodies, on im-
provement of drinking water quality, on study of correlation of the climate change 
and condition of water bodies and wet-lands, on other projects on mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change as well as projects on prevention and reduction of the 
pollution of water bodies and marine environment from land based sources.”83 In 
the Declaration of the Ministers of the Environment following the ninth meeting 
of the Working Group on Environment held in Tromsø in 2010, water has been 
made a distinct issue in the Barents environmental cooperation. !e Declaration 
highlights that further cooperation is needed for the management of transbound-
ary watercourses, pollution prevention and reduction, knowledge exchange as well 
as for the development of common criteria for monitoring and research.
Although water and the protection of transboundary watercourses is now an 
integral part of the Barents environmental cooperation and therefore the imple-
mentation of the Watercourse Convention within the Barents framework is guar-
anteed, it has nevertheless been of fairly recent origin in the BEAR context. It can 
only be speculated why this is the case: either, the problems related to polluted 
water have increased in the latter years, or the functioning and trust within the 
Barents environmental cooperation allowed for a diversi$cation of the cooperation 
in general; thus enabling a multilateral approach towards tackling transboundary 
water issues.
82. See, for instance, BEAC WGE. 2004 (b). Barents Euro-Arctic Council – Meeting of the Working 
Group on Environment. March 18, 2004 – Vuokatti – Minutes, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/
docs/WGE_minutes.pdf, accessed January 12, 2011, p. 2.
83. BEAC. 2010 (b). Work Programme – Subgroup on Water Issues. Swedish Chairmanship 2010–
2011,http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE_Petrozavodsk_9_10_Nov_2010_Work_Pro-
gramme_Subgroup_on_Water_Issues_Final.pdf, February 4, 2012, p. 2.
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6.7. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, 2002
Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) constitute a major threat to life in the Arctic 
– both wildlife and human – but for their largest part originate in areas outside 
of the Arctic as a byproduct of agricultural and industrial activities.84 Due to the 
great harm to environmental and human health in the Arctic, the AMAP launched 
a $rst comprehensive assessment in 1997/98 on POPs, which signi$cantly contrib-
uted to the cra#ing of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Pollutants (POPs 
Convention), which was concluded in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. While 
all Barents countries have rati$ed the convention in its early stages, Russia has not 
rati$ed it until November 15, 2011.85
Reference to POPs or the POPs Convention is made on several occasions in the 
accessible documents of the BEAR. For instance, already in 2001 the Ministers 
of the Environment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council “stressed the need to 
strengthen implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements to safe-
guard the environment in the Barents Region, such as the UNEP Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.”86 Shortly a#er the coming into force of the Convention on 
May 17, 2004, the WGE September 2004 meeting minutes re%ect POPs as a matter 
of concern for the Barents Region with direct relevance for the work of the WGE. 
While not referred to under the BEAR umbrella directly, projects carried out under 
ACAP dealing with the elimination of POPs as a priority $eld for ACAP are based 
on the POPs Convention.87 !ese projects themselves are based on the NEFCO/
AMAP Hot Spot List which has been an integral part of the Barents environmen-
tal cooperation while cooperation with ACAP has been made a prime concern 
of the BEAR in the Kirkenes Declaration. In a similar vein, also the 2005 WGE 
January meeting makes reference to POPs in the context of Hot Spot elimination 
84. AMAP (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme). 2009. Arctic Pollution 2009, AMAP, 
Oslo, pp. 5–6.
85. See also Russian Presidential Executive O&ce. 2011. Rati$cation of Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants, http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/2474, accessed January 4, 2012.
86. BEAC (Barents Euro-Arctic Council). 2001. Joint Statement of the Environment Ministers of 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/WGE_Kirkenes_state-
ment.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 1.
87. BEAC WGE. 2004 (c). Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Meeting of the Working Group on En-
vironment (WGE), 13–14 September, 2004, Helsinki, Finland, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/
docs/WGE_2004September_minutes_$nal.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 2.
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and a source for project $nancing.88 !e phasing out and the ultimate destruction 
of PCBs in Russia was raised by the ACAP representative at the WGE 2005 May 
meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia. While not expressed under BEAR auspices, the 
Russian representative in the meeting linked the development of such legislation in 
Russia to the rati$cation of the POPs Convention in the same meeting and noted 
that “[a]ctive preparations for rati$cation are going on.”89
Both on the political and the implementing side the POPs Convention $nds 
reference in the Barents environmental cooperation up to the time of writing. 
While for instance the environment ministers declared in 2005 that they “wel-
comed the entry into force of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants,”90 they also highlight the “progress on implementation of the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants […]” and “the importance of each 
country establishing and putting into force a National Plan for Implementation of 
the Convention.”91 Yet, also the Regional Working Group on Environment makes 
POPs a primary concern for its activities92 while the Subgroup on Water Issues and 
Transboundary Pollution in its Action Program 2008–2009 identi$es POPs as a 
major threat to the Barents Region93 with concrete assessment results as re%ected 
in its 2010–2011 Work Programme.94
!e POPs Convention has become an integral part of the work of the Barents envi-
ronmental cooperation in spite of an absence of direct reference to the convention in 
e.g. the context of the Subgroup on Cleaner Production and Sustainable Consumption 
in relation to the phasing-out of the production of POPs in Russia or in the work pro-
gramme of the Subgroup on “Hot Spot” Exclusion for the destruction of POPs. !is is 
88. BEAC WGE. 2005 (a). Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Meeting of the Working Group on En-
vironment (WGE). 26–27 January 2005, Oulu, Finland, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/
WGE_Oulu_Januaryminutes_$nal.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 3.
89. BEAC WGE. 2005(b). Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Meeting of the Working Group on Envi-
ronment (WGE). 26–27 May 2005, St. Petersburg, Russia, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/
WGE_2005_Mayminutes_$nal.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 3.
90. BEAC. 2005. Seventh Meeting of Environment Ministers – Declaration. October 19, 2005, 
http://www.ymparisto.$/download.asp?contentid=42538, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 1.
91. BEAC (Barents Euro-Arctic Council). 2007. Eight Meeting of the Ministers of the Environment 
– Declaration. November 9, 2007, Moscow, Russian Federation, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/
docs/WGE+MinisterialDeclaration+9+November2007.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 1.
92. RWGE. 2007–2010 Action Program, http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/RWGE_Action_Pro-
gram2007-2010.pdf, January 5, 2012, pp. 7–8.
93. BEAC WGE. 2008–2009. Subgroup on Water Issues. Strategy and Action Program 2008–2009, 
http://www.barentsinfo.$/beac/docs/EAnnex-6_WGE_Sub_group_on_water_issues_strategy_
and_action_plan_$nal-English.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012, p. 4.
94. BEAC WGE. 2010 (b): 9.
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surprising, and a reason for this absence cannot be given based on the available docu-
ments. Yet, personal communication with the Subgroup on Cleaner Production and 
Sustainable Consumption and the Subgroup on “Hot Spot” Exclusion95 has shown 
that there is no need for direct reference to POPs or the POPs Convention as it has 
been integral to the subgroups’ work and the close cooperation with ACAP on elimi-
nating the environmental hot spots is a way to implement the POPs Convention on 
a BEAR level while the objectives of both the POPs Convention and the LRTAP 
Convention are integrated in the creation of projects of the two subgroups.
7. Dealing with Russian non-Ratification
An e"ective functioning of the Barents environmental cooperation and implemen-
tation of MEAs is not possible without Russian participation, due to the so#-law 
nature of the Barents cooperation. As can be seen from the above, Russia is not a 
party to several multilateral environmental agreements which are of relevance for 
the Barents environmental cooperation and therefore of signi$cance for the envi-
ronmental integrity of the Barents Region. Yet, a non-rati$cation of a convention 
by the Russian side which has been rati$ed by the Nordic states does not mean 
that certain conventions or provisions cannot be applied under the umbrella of 
the BEAR. !ere are several ways and strategies that the Barents environmental 
cooperation has either applied from the outset or applies now in order to prevent 
a lack of implementation due to Russian non-rati$cation.
!e Russian status of rati$cation is particularly relevant when looking at the 
protocols to the LRTAP Convention 1979. !e Convention has been extended by 
so far eight protocols.96 Russia has accepted three protocols, i.e., until 1988, while 
she has also signed the 1994 Sulfur Protocol. !is means that neither signature 
nor rati$cation has occurred for four protocols, thus severely compromising their 
implementation status in the Barents context. In spite of this adverse e"ect on the 
e&cacy of the Barents environmental cooperation to tackle air-borne pollution 
in the Region, the BEAR closely cooperates with the ACAP as also set out in the 
95. Personal Communication. (Temporary) Subgroup on “Hot Spot” Exclusion. January 10, 2011.
96. 1984  Protocol on Long-term Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP);1985 Proto-
col on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per 
cent; 1988 Protocol concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Flux-
es;1991 Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their 
Transboundary Fluxes; 1994 Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions;1998 Proto-
col on Heavy Metals; 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs);1999 Protocol to 
Abate Acidi$cation, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone.
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Kirkenes Declaration. Under ACAP, air pollution and the tackling of their sources 
and consequences plays a major role and is manifested in its seven Steering Groups 
which inter alia deal with Mercury, Pesticides, Dioxins/Furans or Community 
Action Initiative. !us, while Russia as a Barents state has not rati$ed certain 
protocols, through the close cooperation with ACAP provisions of these protocols 
$nd their ways into the Barents environmental cooperation and thereby become 
relevant for Russia as well. Furthermore, as is the case with the POPs Convention, 
the normative role of the LRTAP Convention in international environmental law 
and its relevance for the e"ective functioning and development of the Barents en-
vironmental cooperation place a certain degree of political pressure on Russian ad-
herence to all LRTAP Protocols, also to those to which she is not a party. !erefore, 
under e.g. the Subgroup on Cleaner Production and Sustainable Consumption all 
spheres of cooperation are strongly a"ected by the Convention.
A similar strategy can be seen when dealing with POPs under the BEAR. As 
mentioned earlier, Russia has only very recently become a party to the convention 
and the BEAR needed to rely on the close cooperation with ACAP and the norma-
tive status of the convention in order to implement the convention in the Barents 
Region.97 !e relevance of the POPs Convention as re%ected in the documentation 
of the Barents cooperation has contributed to the Convention as being an integral 
part of project design and development. Even during Russia’s absence from the POPs 
Regime the Barents Environment Ministers were able to agree on certain wording 
in their Declarations. For instance, the 2007 Moscow Declaration of the Ministers 
for the Environment following the Eight Meeting of the Environment Ministers of 
the BEAC reads in paragraph 8 that the Ministers “encouraged further joint project 
activities and stressed the need to use already achieved results on PCBs, dioxins, 
obsolete pesticides and mercury. Further work should be coordinated with other 
activities in the $eld with the aim to reduce persistent organic pollutants and heavy 
metals in the Barents region through joint e"orts with the ACAP and NEFCO” 
[original emphasis].98 While Russia was certainly not forced by these wordings to 
97. Since the Russian rati$cation of the POPs regime is of such recent origin, no reference can yet 
be made on the normative and procedural changes project development in the Barents environ-
mental cooperation is undergoing due to this rati$cation.
98. !e Moscow Declaration is the only ministerial declaration under the BEAC that highlights the 
importance of implementing national plans for the POPs Convention. While the 2005 Tromsø De-
claration following the Seventh Meeting of the Environment Ministers of the BEAC under Section 
2 a and d “ welcomed the entry into force of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pol-
lutants in May 2004,” the 2011 Umeå Declaration following the Ninth Meeting of the Environment 
Ministers of the BEAC “welcomed the recent rati$cation of the Stockholm convention on POPs by 
the Russian Federation” yet with no recommendations for implementing the Convention.
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join the POPs Regime, one the hand she would not have consented to such wording 
if she would have been strongly opposed to the application of the POPs Convention’s 
provisions, while on the other hand these wordings encouraged Russia even more 
to join the POPs regime in order to be able to adhere to international standards.
In the case of the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in 
a Transboundary Context Russian non-rati$cation99 does not challenge the ef-
fectiveness of the Convention in the Barents context: Firstly, Russia is party to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969100 which to a large extent re%ects 
customary law on treaties. It can be argued that although Russia has not rati$ed 
but signed the Espoo Convention, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention neverthe-
less provides the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, unless 
the intent not to become party to a treaty has been made clear. However, what this 
obligation requires in the end and/or whether it is a mere a so# law obligation is 
subject to scholarly debate.101 Secondly, through her signature Russia herself has 
implemented EIA Procedures which go beyond domestic assessment e"orts. For 
example in the case of the Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline, Russia opened its EIA mecha-
nisms to the extent permitted by its domestic EIA to those of the other a"ected 
states.102 It is thus a matter of speci$c considerations for Russia to consider in indi-
vidual cases to apply the Espoo Convention.103 Lastly, close cooperation with ACAP 
and NEFCO which both make e"ective use of environmental impact assessments, 
both in a domestic and transboundary context, make the Espoo Convention ap-
99. Russia is a signatory to the Convention, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4&chapter=27&lang=en, accessed February 15, 2012.
100. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapte
r=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, accessed February 15, 2012.
101. It must be noted that under the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt rule states cannot be forced 
to become a party to a Convention, also manifested in Article 34 of the VCLT. Fitzmaurice (pp. 
41–44) highlights the di&culties of reconciling Arts. 18 and 34. !e legal obligations for states 
set forth under these articles depend on the category in relation to a treaty the state belongs 
to, i.e. whether it is a party to the treaty; whether it is extraneous to the treaty; or whether it 
is a negotiating or contracting state or a state entitled to become a party. Fitzmaurice, Malgo-
sia. 2002. “!ird Parties and the Law of Treaties.” In: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law. Kluwer Law International; pp. 37–137, http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/
$tzmaurice_6.pdf, accessed February 15, 2012; for a detailed analysis of the legal obligations 
under Art. 18 VCLT, see: Charme, Joni S. 1991. “!e Interim Obligation under Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma.” In: George Washington 
Journal on International Law & Economics. Vol. 25 (1), National Law Centre of George Wash-
ington University, Washington D.C., pp 71–114.
102. See supra note 75, p. 305.
103. !is hypothesis is backed by the fact that the Kirkenes Declaration merely refers to “observing” 
the developments in regard to the Espoo Convention.
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plicable in the Barents environmental cooperation and create a standardized en-
vironment which Russia is embedded in.
8. Conclusion
!is article dealt with the re%ection of MEAs in the environmental dimension of 
the Barents cooperation. In conclusion can be said that the standards of interna-
tional environmental policy are well adhered to in the Barents environmental co-
operation. Fundamental MEAs can be found in the policy and working documents 
of the cooperation, i.e., Ministerial Declarations, Working Groups programmes, 
and the accompanying reports and documents such as meeting minutes. !ese 
re%ect an active discourse on e"ective implementation of these MEAs. !e rati$ca-
tion of the POPs Convention by Russia makes the more e&cient application of the 
POPs regime in the Barents context more likely. However, the mere application of 
provisions of international environmental law in the Barents environmental co-
operation does not necessarily mean an actual improvement of the environmental 
conditions. But certainly it elevates the overall legitimacy of the cooperation when 
it follows and implements international environmental standards.104
!e article has shown that even in light of Russian non-rati$cation of certain 
environmental agreements the Barents environmental cooperation is nevertheless 
able to implement their provisions. While this is to a large extent based on the 
normative role these agreements play internationally, in the Barents context it is 
through speci$c projects and other activities which are designed in a certain way 
adhering to international standards. Evidently, in order to ensure the function-
ing of the Barents environmental cooperation and in the long-run to improve the 
environmental conditions in the Region, Russia does not object to these project 
designs, but makes these an integral part of project implementation.
It can be assumed that in case of a Russian rati$cation of those MEAs to which 
she is a not signatory state or to which she is a signatory, positive repercussions 
could be noted in the Barents environmental cooperation – further increasing the 
probability of an improvement of the environmental conditions in the Barents 
Region.
104. For a detailed study on e"ectiveness, problem-solving capabilities and goal-attainment strate-
gies of the Barents environmental cooperation, see: Sellheim, Nikolas, “Problem-solving Ca-
pabilities, Goal Attainment and E"ectiveness of the Barents Environment Cooperation.” In: 
 Alfredsson, Gudmundur, Timo Koivurova and Md. Waliul Hasanat (eds.). !e Yearbook of Polar 
Law, Vol. 4, forthcoming.
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Резюме
Баренцевый Евро-Арктический регион (БЕАР), который был основан в 
1993 году, является двухступенчатым форумом в рамках сотрудничества 
между правительствами и странами в этом регионе. Фундаментом 
Баренцева региона стало подписание Киркенесской декларации, главной 
целью которой является содействие устойчивому развитию в этом 
регионе. Защита окружающей среды должна быть включена во все сферы 
деятельности. В статье анализируется концепция устойчивого развития 
в кооперативной структуре БЕАР на основе Декларации Рио (1992 г.) и 
Конвенции ООН «Повестка дня на XXI век». Здесь также приведен анализ 
нескольких отдельных МПС в рабочих процедурах БЕАР. В ряде случаев, 
в силу различного уровня ратификации некоторых многосторонних 
природоохранных соглашений в странах России и Северных государств 
Баренцева региона, их реализация в рамках БЕАР довольно сложна. Тем 
не менее, форум разработал различные стратегии, которые позволяют их 
успешно применять на территории всего Баренцева региона.
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